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The Evolving Corporate Board 
Murray Weidenbaum 
In a period of takeover battles and dramatic 
replacements of top managements, the role of 
the corporate board of directors is rapidly 
evolving into a major strategic force in Ameri-
can business. 
Some companies have enacted "poison pill" 
provisions, which put the board of directors 
squarely in the middle of merger and acquisi-
tion battles. The directors adopt such a meas-
ure to discourage unwanted takeovers. The 
"pill" is in the form of new rights to sharehold-
ers to acquire, at a marked discount, a large 
equity stake in any successful suitor whose of-
fer has not been approved by the company's 
board. The new activism on the part of corpo-
rate directors rose in 1993 to include replacing 
the chief executive officers for such industrial 
giants as American Express, Eastman Kodak, 
General Motors, and IBM. 
The new burst of public attention to the cor-
porate board, from friend and foe alike, is 
matched by widespread ignorance - both of 
how that important economic institution func-
tions and how it has been changing in recent 
years. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the 
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evolving role of boards of directors, with spe-
cial attention to the strengthening of the board 
at a time when it is often the focal point of cor-
porate response to external threats. Although I 
present my own viewpoint, developed in part 
from my service as a corporate director, much 
of this report draws from many studies in law, 
economics, and business administration. 
Criticisms of the Board 
Three major criticisms have been leveled at 
the institution of the corporate board of direc-
tors. 
The Board Is a Rubber Stamp 
One retired board chairman of a successful 
company describes the board of directors as the 
"Achilles heel of the American corporation." 1 
A leading scholar refers to the corporate board 
as an "impotent legal fiction. "2 
The most frequently made criticism of the 
corporate board of directors is that it is cere-
monial, rubber-stamping the views of manage-
ment. This belief comes from many sources. 
In his 1948 classic study of large companies, 
R.A. Gordon concluded that directors are 
closer to top management than to the stock-
holders, and that ratification of management 
proposals by the board is largely a formality. 3 
He also reported that, as a result of its control 
of the proxy machinery, it is more common for 
management to select directors than vice versa. 
Myles L. Mace, in his authoritative study of 
corporate boards in the late 1960s, reported 
that the role of directors is largely advisory and 
not of a decision-making nature. He quotes 
one company president as saying, "The board 
of directors serves as a sounding board .... 
The decision is not made by the board. "4 
An account of the bankruptcy of the Penn 
Central reached an even stronger conclusion: 
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Penn Central's directors seem to have done 
very little to earn the $200 each received 
each time he attended a board meeting. . . . 
With few exceptions, they appeared to be 
blind to the on-rushing events that sent the 
Penn Central hurtling off the tracks. 5 
Robert H. Malott, an experienced corporate 
director and retired chief executive officer 
(CEO), identifies the biggest barrier to effective 
outside directorship as the "old boy" network 
that dominates some boards. This makes it 
personally unpleasant for directors to question 
the performance of their peers "and often their 
friends. "6 
The "old boy" network that dominates 
some boards makes it personally 
unpleasant for directors to question 
the performance of their peers. 
The Board Is Dominated by the CEO 
A closely related criticism is that the board's 
deliberations are dominated by the CEO, who 
typically also serves as chairman. When the 
same person controls the agenda and conduct of 
boardroom proceedings as well as the day-to-
day performance of the company, the power of 
the individual director may indeed become at-
tenuated. Despite the rising number of outside 
directors and special committees of corporate 
boards, in most cases the center of power re-
mains with the management. CEOs serve as 
chairman of the board in 80 percent of the 
larger corporations. 
Management consultants report that many 
directors act as part of top management, rather 
than as monitors able and willing to reward and 
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penalize management's performance.7 A long-
time board member states that the ambiguity of 
the role of the corporate board begins with the 
prevailing combination of management leader-
ship and board leadership in the same person. 8 
The Board Is Plagued with Conflicts of 
Interest 
Corporate directors often are criticized for 
conflicts of interest and for showing greater 
concern for the welfare of other companies. 
Many outside directors of corporations do busi-
ness with the companies on whose board they 
serve. The literature contains a number of 
cases of apparent wrongdoing on the part of 
outside directors who were also officers of 
companies that supplied services to the corpo-
ration or who benefited unfairly from company 
operations. 9 
An analysis of 286 banks that failed in 1990 
and 1991 revealed that, in 74 cases, the main 
cause of the failure was fraud and other abuses 
by directors and officers, such as receiving 
loans at very low rates. In 101 other instances, 
insider abuses contributed to the bank's insol-
vency.10 
In the case of the Penn Central, a staff re-
port of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency of the U.S. House of Representatives 
censured the company's board members for 
their excessive involvement in other corporate 
boards. The Committee staff noted the sub-
servience of many of the outside directors to 
the interests of the financial institutions of 
which they were officers. As corporate boards 
shift to a larger percentage of outside directors, 
the likelihood of such corporate "interlocks" 
could increase. 11 
In the case of the larger firms, a problem is 
emerging in the form of opportunity for "back-
scratching" when setting management compen-
sation. The board's compensation committee is 
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typically a group dominated by outside direc-
tors. What's wrong with that? Frequently, 
those outside directors are senior officers of 
other firms, who are very sympathetic to mo-
tions for generous treatment of their counter-
parts. Aside from the intrinsic merits of the 
matter, their self-interest dictates such a stand. 
After all, the compensation committees of their 
own boards are often similarly composed of 
CEOs of peer firms. Moreover, the manage-
ment consultants advising those committees 
take full account of such peer-group action by 
the other boards. The ratchet effect that results 
is quite obvious. 
Other nominally independent outside direc-
tors, in practice, may represent another set of 
special interests - those of the local commu-
nity. Senior officers of local firms that primar-
ily sell goods and services to the surrounding 
area may see great value in the company donat-
ing lavishly to local causes, even if its markets 
are national or international. Another serious 
concern is the relationship of the inside direc-
tors to the chairman/CEO. After all, he is their 
day-to-day supervisor, usually with the effec-
tive authority to radically change the directors' 
role in the company and even to fire or demote 
them. It is rare to see a subordinate officer 
serving on a board dissent from the position 
taken by the CEO. 
The Push for Reform 
Criticisms of the board have led to a variety 
of proposals to reform corporate governance: 
Ralph Nader's Proposals 
Over the years, Ralph Nader and his col-
leagues have developed numerous ambitious 
and far-reaching proposals to restructure the 
corporation. To give "all stockholders in cor-
porate decision-making a real voice in corpo-
5 
rate governance," he advocates a Corporate 
Democracy Act. Under this proposal, the fed-
eral government would assume the chartering 
power now residing in the individual states. 
Nader wants to install full-time outside direc-
tors who would take an active role in the gov-
f h . 12 ernance o t e corporatiOn. 
It is interesting to note that the charter of the 
Equitable Life Insurance Company requires the 
Chief Justice of New Jersey to appoint several 
outside directors. Over the years, these ap-
pointees have included women civic leaders 
and physicians, who are far from typical corpo-
rate directors. Under the Nader approach, in-
dividual directors would be assigned responsi-
bility for specific areas of concern, such as the 
environment or employee relations. In his con-
cept, federal chartering would develop a 
"constitutionalism" for corporate employees 
and provide various protections for whistle 
blowers who object to specific company activi-
ties. He also urges a mandatory mail plebiscite 
of shareholders on all "fundamental" transac-
tions. 
The intent of his reforms, according to 
Nader, is to address a concept of "social bank-
ruptcy" whereby a company would be thrown 
into receivership if it failed to meet its "social" 
obligations. 
The Geneen-Williams Proposals 
More modest- yet quite substantial- sug-
gestions for change in the structure of the 
American corporation have come from several 
outspoken former corporate CEOs. The two 
that have received most attention are Harold 
Geneen, retired CEO of ITT, and Harold Wil-
liams, former chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and former CEO 
of Norton Simon. Williams contends that the 
ideal board of directors would include only one 
company officer, the chief executive. All other 
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board members, including the chairman, would 
be chosen from outside the company. Wil-
liams's concept of outside directors excludes 
bankers, lawyers, or anyone else having busi-
ness dealings with the company. In his view, 
outside-dominated boards could do a better job 
of representing the stockholders' long-term in-
terests than executives who are responsible for 
day-to-day management. 
Outside-dominated boards could do a better 
job of representing the stockholders' 
long-term interests. 
There is considerable precedent for an out-
side director chairing the board meetings. That 
is the standard procedure at non-profit institu-
tions such as hospitals, museums, and universi-
ties, many of which rival in size and complex-
ity all but the largest for-profit corporations. 
Also, many Western European companies nor-
mally follow this practice, as do many Ameri-
can companies with concentrated ownership on 
the part of venture capitalists and other outside 
investors. 
Williams, unlike Nader, would not allocate 
individual directorships to representatives of 
employees, consumers, minorities, or other 
groups. "It would be disastrous .... Constitu-
ency representative . . . makes the board a po-
litical body," according to Williams. Does his 
proposal infringe on private property rights? 
The former SEC chairman states that corpora-
tions are more than economic institutions 
owned by shareholders: "Corporate America 
is too important, and perceived as too power-




Geneen would go further than Williams, 
barring all members of management from 
serving on the board of the corporation for 
which they work. The CEO and other mem-
bers of management would continue to attend 
board meetings, but they would be there to re-
port to the board and to explain their actions. 14 
Other Reform Proposals 
In a variation of Geneen's approach, Walter 
J. Salmon, of the Harvard Business School and 
a veteran board member, suggests that the 
boards of larger corporations be limited to 
three inside directors - the chief executive of-
ficer (CEO), the chief operating officer (COO), 
and the chief financial officer (CPO). As the 
current leaders of the corporation, the CEO and 
COO are there to communicate, explain, and 
justify strategic direction to the outside direc-
tors. Because CFOs share fiduciary responsi-
bility with the directors for the fmancial con-
duct of the corporation, they should also have a 
seat on the board. 15 
A more modest variation on the theme of 
strengthening the role of the outside directors is 
the Principles of Corporate Governance and 
Structure proposed by the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI). The ALI proposed to replace vol-
untary arrangements on corporate governance, 
as interpreted by the courts, with legislative 
statutes and administrative regulations. For ex-
ample, the ALI recommended that, as a matter 
of law, a majority of the board members of 
each large publicly held corporation (those with 
at least 2,000 shareholders and $100 million in 
total assets) must be outside directors. Follow-
ing substantial criticism from the business 
community, the ALI proposal has remained 
1 b . .& d" . 16 mere y a as1s tor tscussion. 
It does not seem likely that any of these sets 
of detailed proposals for the reform of corpo-
rate governance will be adopted on a compul-
8 
sory basis. Yet, legislators continue to intro-
duce proposals for legislating some of these 
changes. In 1993, Representative Ed Markey 
(D-Mass.) urged that the federal government 
require that all board chairmen be outside di-
rectors. He would also limit the number of 
boards that a director can serve on. In the 
United Kingdom, the Cadbury Committee on 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance has 
urged that non-management (outside) directors 
serve on only one board. 
Voluntary Changes in the Boardroom 
While the criticism of corporate governance 
continues unabated, important changes in the 
boardroom are being made on a voluntary ba-
sis. These adaptive adjustments have resulted 
from significant shifts in the environment in 
which corporations and their boards function. 
First is increased government regulation and 
the threat of further intervention. The second 
influence is active concern with corporate gov-
ernance by some large institutional investors 
(especially state and local government em-
ployee pension funds). Other factors include 
greater foreign competition, rising levels of 
litigation by shareholders, and criticism from 
the press. In part, these changes deflect or re-
duce the pressures for new statutes or regula-
tions requiring compulsory modifications in 
corporate governance. Also, the increased li-
ability of corporate directors for their actions is 
reinforcing the trend toward their greater in-
volvement in company decision-making. 
According to the head of a major consulting 
firm, "Passive ceremonial directors are fast be-
. d d . " 17 A f commg an en angere species. survey o 
the boards of directors of large U.S. corpora-
tions concluded that "the days of the 'rubber 
stamp' board are over. "18 Clearly, many 
boards are taking on a more active role. 
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Eight Basic Changes 
Eight basic voluntary changes in the board-
room can be identified: 
1. Outside directors have become a ma-
jority of most boards of large companies in 
the United States, and the move toward 
more outside directors continues. In 1938, 
only one-half of industrial corporations had 
majorities of outsiders on their boards. By 
1992, the average corporate board had nine 
outside directors and three inside directors. 
Also, board size has declined somewhat, re-
flecting in part the reduced role of inside direc-
tors. In 1992, the typical board had 14 direc-
tors, down from 16 in 1982. 
Some movement is also being made volun-
tarily toward the Geneen-Williams view on 
board composition. Of the 100 large corpora-
tions analyzed in 1992 by the executive search 
firm Spencer Stuart, eleven were comprised 
entirely of outside directors except for the 
chairman/CEO. In 1987, this condition was 
true in only 3 of the 100 firms. Simultane-
ously, the prevalence of "dependent" outside 
directors (those who also provide services to 
the company) has diminished. In the 1970s, 
the average board included a commercial 
banker and/or an attorney. That is true in only 
a small minority of instances in the 1990s. 19 
2. A broader diversity of backgrounds is 
evident in the type of persons serving on 
corporate boards. Increased numbers of di-
rectors have public service, academic, and sci-
entific experience. Boards also include rising 
percentages of women and minorities. A sur-
vey of top company board placements in 1992 
indicated that approximately 30 percent were 
women or blacks. 20 During the same period, 
the percentage of boards with ethnic minority 
members rose from 11 percent to 26 percent, 
those with academics from 36 percent to 52 
percent, and those with former government of-
ficials from 12 percent to 31 percent. 
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Another trend in the composition of U.S. 
boards of directors is the rising number of di-
rectors from other countries. In 1992, 22 of 
the 100 large corporations surveyed by Spencer 
Stuart had a total of 27 international outside di-
rectors. 
A survey of top company board placements 
in 1992 indicated that approximately 
30 percent were women or blacks. 
3. Auditing committees have become a 
nearly universal phenomenon. Typically, 
these fmancial oversight bodies are composed 
entirely of independent outside directors (an ab-
solute requirement for firms listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange). The audit committees 
have direct access to both outside and inside 
auditors and usually review the financial as-
pects of company operations in great detail. As 
recently as 1973, only one-half of large U.S. 
corporations had auditing committees. Cur-
rently, the proportion is 99 percent. 
4. In many companies, nominating 
committees propose both candidates for the 
board and senior officers. These committees 
usually have a strong majority of outside direc-
tors (typically, four out of five). However, 
these statistics do little to illuminate the continu-
ing powerful role of the CEO in initiating or 
approving committee selections. In practice, 
most outside directors are selected by the 
chairman/CEO and in virtually all cases, he or 
she must be agreeable to their appointment. 
5. In most large companies, compensa-
tion committees evaluate the performance of 
top executives and determine the terms and 
conditions of their employment. These 
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committees are composed largely or entirely of 
outside directors. In practice, many of these 
committees rely extensively on outside consult-
ants whose compensation surveys often set the 
framework for committee deliberations. 
6. On average, about one out of five of 
the larger companies have established public-
policy committees on their boards. These 
committees give board-level attention to com-
pany policies and performance on subjects of 
special public concern. Topics with which 
public-policy committees often deal include af-
firmative action and equal employment oppor-
tunity, employee health and safety, company 
impact on the environment, corporate political 
activities, consumer affairs, and ethics. 
Pfizer, the large pharmaceutical firm, has 
appointed a new vice president for corporate 
governance. The company's expectation is that 
this officer will be proactive in responding to 
legislation and regulations in the field of corpo-
rate governance and will advise the top man-
agement on the latest thinking on corporate 
structure and shareholder relations. 21 
7. Internal management and accounting 
control systems have been strengthened. In 
part, the impetus has come from the need to 
comply with the provisions of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act. The activities of the audit 
committees surely are a reinforcing factor. As 
a result, the flow of information to board mem-
bers has been upgraded and expanded. 
8. Recruiting directors has become more 
difficult. Increasing the role and the remu-
neration of directors have helped make board 
service more attractive. However, these posi-
tive factors are on occasion offset by a change 
in the narrow, technical area of directors' li-
ability insurance. In recent years, courts have 
narrowed the scope of the business judgment 
rule, which provides board discretion to board 
members in carrying out their functions. The 
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resultant acceleration of lawsuits against corpo-
rate boards has increased the costs of the insur-
ance companies that have previously covered 
the bulk of such expenses. In turn, this has led 
to a marked decline in the willingness of carri-
ers to write directors' and officers' liability in-
surance policies. As a consequence, some di-
rectors have reduced the number of boards on 
which they serve in order to concentrate on 
their responsibilities on the remaining boards. 
Boards have traditionally responded 
strongly when corporations have 
faced real crises. 
Boards have traditionally responded strongly 
when corporations have faced real crises. In 
the early 1990s, outside directors began taking 
a more active stance in reacting to poor per-
formance on the part of the managements re-
porting to them and thus to avoid the develop-
ment of crisis situations. In 1992, the General 
Motors board, led by outside directors, re-
placed the CEO and designated an outside di-
rector (a recently retired CEO of another major 
enterprise) as nonexecutive chairman. 
In 1993, IBM, after replacing its CEO, cre-
ated a new committee of outside directors to 
focus on corporate governance. The function 
of the new committee is to nominate new direc-
tors, handle proposals from shareholders, and 
oversee the functioning of the board. In the 
same year, Eastman Kodak replaced its CEO 
and formed a corporate directors committee of 
outside directors to oversee its basic strategy. 
An important and voluntary institutional 
change occurred in 1994 when the board of di-
13 
rectors of General Motors issued 28 "guidelines 
on significant corporate governance issues. " 
The GM guidelines formalize the stronger con-
trol over management that the board had moved 
to in 1992. Specifics include designating a 
"lead" outside director to chair three meetings 
of independent directors a year, giving the 
board rather than the CEO real authority to se-
lect new members, and a new director affairs 
committee. The duties of that new committee 
include assigning members to board committees 
and evaluating the board's performance each 
year.22 
Labor Empowerment on the Board 
As a result of the financial difficulties en-
countered by many companies during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, some labor unions were given 
the authority to designate one or more members 
of the firm's board of directors as part of an 
overall package that contained reductions from 
customary wage increases and often outright 
cuts in labor compensation. In 1980, Chrysler 
Corporation became the first major company in 
the United States to elect a union leader to its 
board. That was done in connection with a 
package of union concessions to help the com-
pany to continue operating during a very diffi-
cult period. 
In 1983, the Teamsters Union agreed to a 
substantial lowering of wage and benefit levels 
at Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., a 
company hard hit by competition from nonun-
ion truckers. In return, workers were given 
just over 50 percent of the stock and the right 
to elect three of the seven members of the 
board. At five other trucking firms, the Union 
agreed to a similar package, but worker owner-
ship was kept to less than 50 percent. In some 
instances, the union-designated board members 
have been retired executives from business and 
government, avoiding conflicts of interest. 
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In 1993, several steel companies - Bethle-
hem, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, and LTV - agreed 
to having a representative of the United Steel-
workers Union serve on their boards. At about 
the same time, Northwest Airlines and TWA 
both agreed to give their employees a major 
share of the corporation's ownership. As part 
of a move out of bankruptcy, TWA gave its 
employees a 45 percent ownership of the com-
pany plus four board seats. Northwest pro-
vided three board seats plus 37.5 percent of the 
company's stock. Both airlines received sev-
eral hundred million dollars of concessions in 
labor costs. 
Union memberships on corporate boards are 
still isolated examples, and the entire subject 
remains extremely controversial. Although the 
concept of employee representation on the 
board is common in Western Europe, it is not a 
generally accepted notion in the United States. 
In Germany, codetermination laws have re-
quired worker representation on the boards of 
larger companies since 1951. However, that 
nation has a long tradition of labor-management 
cooperation. The fact that German worker 
compensation averages higher than other indus-
trialized nations is not an inducement to U.S. 
firms to copy the example. 
Such actions, although few, provide a pow-
erful signal to top management that inadequate 
performance can result in their replacement by 
a hitherto supportive board of directors. It is 
especially noteworthy that these changes in 
management did not require a formal takeover 
("change of control") with its ancillary legion 
of expensive investment bankers, attorneys, and 
accountants. 
Strengthening the Board 
Despite the progress that has been made in 
recent years, most writers on the role of the 
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corporate board reach some variation of the 
same dual conclusion: the board of directors is 
a vital part of the business firm, but it often 
does an inadequate job of carrying out its re-
sponsibility to represent the shareholders. 
The result can be a policy vacuum, which 
provides opportunity for those outside of the 
corporation. Dramatic moves have been made 
to take advantage of the fundamental shortcom-
ing of corporate boards. These responses have 
come from the so-called predatory raiders who 
attempt to take advantage of the latent support 
of shareholders for changes in the status quo. 
Predatory raiders take advantage of the 
latent support of shareholders for 
changes in the status quo. 
Of course, corporate managements view this 
phenomenon differently. A spokesman for the 
Business Roundtable describes the strategy of 
"professional raiders" as waging "blitzkrieg 
warfare" devised to "outflank the corporate 
board of directors and stampede the stockhold-
ers. "
23 There is no need to glamorize the ac-
tivities or the motives of the raiders while not-
ing the positive contributions they make. One 
of the most successful takeover specialists de-
scribes his efforts as "acting in pursuit of per-
sonal financial gain and not out of altruism . . . 
I do it to make money." 
Recommendations 
The following suggestions are offered in the 
spirit of strengthening the corporate board 
without setting up a mechanism competitive 
with the company management: 
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We must recognize the extent to which 
takeover battles have occurred because of 
the cumulative inaction of some boards of di-
rectors. It is easy enough to denounce finan-
cial entrepreneurs who have little interest in the 
production of goods and services, but who 
profit - often in the form of "greenmail" -
merely from making unsolicited takeover bids. 
But if they are opportunists, we must ask 
whether existing board and management prac-
tices have created these opportunities. A clue 
is given, perhaps inadvertently, by the Round-
table's lament that a successful corporate de-
fense may involve drastic restructuring to 
maximize share value in the short run. Without 
endorsing the desirability of such a change, we 
can wonder whether it does reflect the true de-
sires of many shareholders who indeed want to 
maximize share value in the short run. 
Despite their attraction to defending man-
agements, legislative proposals to make un-
friendly takeovers more difficult do not deal 
with the fundamental need to respond to the 
desires of the shareholders. That is both the 
basic responsibility of the board and the key to 
its potential power. Corporate officials, both 
board members and officers, may forget that 
shareholders continually vote with their dollars. 
The less frequently key issues are presented to 
the shareholders, the more likely they are to re-
sort to their ultimate weapon - selling their 
holdings in a company whose policies they 
disagree with. 
Observe that some of the problems of the 
takeover targets may have arisen from the 
desire to be more socially responsible. Ex-
amples include Cummins Engine and Control 
Data Corporation, both of which suffered under 
management with an unusual interest in broad 
social problems. Much of the modern man-
agement literature refers to the need for top 
management to balance the desires of employ-
17 
ees, customers, suppliers, public-interest 
groups, and shareholders. For example, the 
Committee for Economic Development, in its 
widely circulated report on the social respon-
sibility of business, stated that the modem pro-
fessional manager is regarded as a trustee bal-
ancing the interests of many diverse 
participants and constituents in the enterprise 
(shareholders are only listed as one among 
many worthy groups). 
The chief executive of a large corporation has 
the problem of reconciling the demands of 
employees for more wages and improved 
benefit plans, customers for lower prices and 
greater values, vendors for higher prices, 
government for more taxes, stockholders for 
higher dividends and greater capital appre-
ciation.24 
In the case of Control Data, after an annual 
loss of $680 million, a new CEO replaced his 
predecessor who had stressed corporate social 
responsibility. The new CEO bluntly stated 
that the previous management had not always 
"thought in terms of building shareholder 
value" and had not built a culture of controlling 
costs.25 
The heart of a positive response to the 
dissatisfaction with corporate perfonnance is 
for directors to act more fully as fiduciaries 
of the shareholders, as the law requires. The 
same authorities who are almost universally 
critical of the way in which corporate boards 
operate are unanimous in their belief that a 
well-functioning governing board is essential to 
the future of the modern corporation. Virtually 
no one has concluded that the board of direc-
tors has outlived its usefulness. Even such 
business critics as Ralph Nader would lodge 
majority responsibility for governing the corpo-
ration in a revitalized board of directors. 
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The most fundamental need in corporate 
governance is educational - get senior cor-
porate officers to understand their high stake 
in enhancing the role of the board of direc-
tors. There would be fewer challenges to the 
existing managements of their companies if 
more boards acted from a day-to-day concern 
with the interests of their shareholders. The 
benefits of a more active board will not be at-
tained without costs. Achieving a stronger and 
more effective board means sharing the author-
ity now lodged in the CEO - and at times 
reaching somewhat different decisions. But 
that does not require the establishment of a 
competitive power center. It does mean being 
more conscious of the desires of shareholders, 
and of the need to keep them more fully in-
formed. Only one person - the chief execu-
tive - can guide the corporation's day-to-day 
activities. That function cannot be performed 
by a committee. 
Achieving a stronger and more 
effective board means sharing the 
authority now lodged in the CEO. 
Successful directors learn to monitor and 
question while creating an atmosphere of confi-
dence in the management. Simultaneously, a 
truly secure CEO will not attempt to stifle 
criticism by individual directors. The legen-
dary Alfred P. Sloan reportedly made the fol-
lowing statement at a General Motors board 
meeting: 
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete 
agreement on the decision here. . . . Then I 
propose we postpone further discussion of 
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this matter until our next meeting to give our-
selves time to develop disagreement and per-
haps gain some understanding of what the 
decision is all about.26 
What about the composition of the board? Ex-
perience teaches us to be leery of simple solu-
tions. An example is the popular proposition 
that only outside directors should serve on a 
corporate board, with the possible exception of 
the CEO. Diversity of talent is a strength in 
the management of an economic organization. 
Retired officers of a company do not be-
long on its board. It is enough to have inde-
pendent outside directors looking over the 
shoulders of the management, without the pre-
vious generation of management also doing so. 
The outsiders have less stake in defending the 
status quo than do the retirees who may have 
created existing conditions. There are advan-
tages in retired corporate officers serving as di-
rectors of other companies, so long as they are 
not competitors of or suppliers to the company 
from which they have retired. 
Corporate boards should consist primar-
ily of independent outsiders. Outside direc-
tors should not represent banks, law firms, 
customers, or the community in which the cor-
poration happens to have its headquarters. 
Such actual or potential conflicts of interest 
should be avoided. A strong but minority rep-
resentation of knowledgeable insiders should 
continue. Nominating committees would do 
well to bear in mind the advice of management 
scholar S. Prakash Sethi that a board of direc-
tors is not a debating society: "While it is 
normal to have different viewpoints and exper-
tise represented on the board, it is illogical to 
represent special interests on the board. "27 
Opinions differ sharply on whether the CEO 
should also serve as chairman of the board. In 
my personal view, the board chairman should 
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usually be an outside director in order to assure 
the independence of the board. Much depends 
on the attitude of the CEO to the board and to 
the specific challenges facing the company. 
There is no compelling need to modify the 
traditional arrangement in the case of a well-
functioning company whose CEO also main-
tains an open, healthy relation with the board. 
In such circumstances, it would be silly to 
change merely for the sake of change. 
However, when the company is not per-
forming well or when the CEO regards the 
board as merely a legal necessity, then a depar-
ture from the status quo is warranted. Under 
such circumstances, it would be helpful if the 
presiding officer had relevant experience - the 
recently retired CEO of another firm or of a 
large non-profit institution, for instance. A few 
other senior members of the management also 
can be useful board members. The chief op-
erating officer would be appropriate. His or 
her presence on the board does not give rise to 
the problems that occur when operating offi-
cials are made board members - when they 
participate in reviewing their own operations 
and those of their colleagues. Because of the 
crucial relationship of financial reporting to the 
monitoring function, the chief financial officer 
probably also should be a board member. 
None of these inside directors can be expected 
to differ frequently with the CEO, thus empha-
sizing the need for a substantial representation 
of outside, independent directors. 
Where the board chairmanship is filled by 
an outside director, the position should be a 
private role whereas the CEO should represent 
the firm to the public. Only the CEO and his 
or her subordinates can truly represent the firm 
in public arenas since they bear the responsi-
bility and possess the authority to conduct the 
business of the company. This approach re-
quires a high degree of good will on the part of 
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both outside directors and corporate officers. 
The indispensable factor in ensuring an effec-
tive board is that directors and management be 
committed to making the board work. A great 
deal of effort and discretion is required on the 
part of outside directors to carry on an active 
and constructive role that is simultaneously 
probing and supportive. 
The indispensable factor is that directors 
and management be committed to 
making the board work. 
The points just made for board service apply 
with equal force to committee work. Com-
pared to board meetings, directors are more 
likely to take the initiative in committees. 
Some institutional protections of the independ-
ence of board committees are necessary and are 
now often in place. Specifically, the audit 
committee - even if the corporation is not 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange -
should consist entirely of independent outside 
directors. The compensation committee, which 
passes on the pay and fringe benefits of top 
management, should be similarly constituted. 
Also, the nominating committee, with a key 
role in selecting directors and senior execu-
tives, should be comprised of independent out-
side members. 
In contrast, the rmance and public-policy 
committees can benefit from a balance be-
tween insiders and outsiders. The manage-
ment directors bring a special institutional 
knowledge, while the outside directors hope-
fully operate with a wider framework. Another 
reason for the mixed finance committee is that 
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it provides a built-in opportunity to balance the 
pressures for dividends and retained earnings. 
Often many shareholders emphasize the short-
run benefits of increased income, whereas 
management is more concerned about investing 
in the company's future growth. Also, the of-
ficers may simply find it easier or at least more 
satisfactory to use retained earnings rather than 
going to the credit markets. For the typical 
business firm, this is not an either-or choice 
' 
but a case of balancing two important and basic 
considerations. 
The subject of board turnover is often a 
painful matter. A directorship is not a type of 
civil-service appointment, but it is not easy to 
dislodge a long-term director. Long-time direc-
tors become so accustomed to the existing way 
of doing business that they viscerally oppose 
innovation on the oldest bureaucratic grounds: 
"We have never done it that way." 
CEOs and other busy professionals are ra-
tioning more carefully than in the past the 
number of boards on which they serve. Like-
wise, boards are more selective in their new 
appointments. Outside directors should be 
truly independent. They should not also simul-
taneously be paid consultants or advisors to the 
management. They should not have their own 
interests in mind, be it supporting the local 
community or advocating more generous treat-
ment of corporate executives generally. Out-
side directors need to bear in mind that, in a 
very special way, the future of the corporation 
is in their hands - so long as they serve the 
desires of the shareholders. 
A Look to the Future 
A growing array of external forces impinges 
on the contemporary corporation. Some of 
these factors are financial and economic, focus-
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ing on the traditional functions of business en-
terprise. Others are social and political, deal-
ing with business responses to other issues. 
Together, these influences will likely produce 
significant further changes in the composition 
of corporate boards of directors to increase the 
active involvement of corporate directors in the 
decisionmaking of the business firm. 
A growing array of external forces will 
likely produce significant further changes 
in the composition of corporate 
boards of directors. 
Looking ahead, researchers and practition-
ers alike in the twenty-first century will proba-
bly still be speculating about the needed 
changes in the roles and activities of corporate 
directors. Fundamentally, this will reflect the 
fact that the corporation is a continually evolv-
ing institution in the U.S. economy and, as ex-
ternal requirements change, key elements such 
as the board of directors continue to adapt and 
modify their actions. These factors help to ex-
plain the fundamental strength and long-term 
resiliency of private enterprise institutions in 
the United States. 
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